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Beyond Muslim identity: Opinion-based groups in the Gezi Park protest 
Abstract (149 words) 
Media depicted Turkish Gezi Park protests as a clash between secularists and Islamists within 
a majority-Muslim country. Extending a social identity approach of protests, this study aims 
(1) to distinguish the protest participants in terms of their opinion-based group memberships, 
(2) investigate how their religious identification and their group membership were associated 
with democratic attitudes. 650 highly-educated urban young-adult participants were surveyed 
during the protest. Latent class analysis of participants’ political concerns and online and 
offline actions yielded four distinct opinion-based groups labeled ‘liberals’, ‘secularists’, 
‘moderates’ and ‘conservatives’. Looking at the intersection of the participants’ group 
identities with their Muslim identification, conservatives and moderates endorsed democratic 
attitudes less with increasing religious identification, whereas religious identification made 
little or no difference in liberals’ and secularists’ democratic attitudes. Our findings of distinct 
groups among protest participants in a majority-Muslim country challenges an essentialist 
understanding of religion as a homogeneous social identity. 
 
 Keywords: Opinion-based group, social identity, Muslim identification, protest, 
collective action, democratic attitudes, grievances, online activism  
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Beyond Muslim identity: Opinion-based groups in the Gezi Park protest 
The 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul were sparked by the destruction of a city park 
to build a shopping mall. The protests quickly spread throughout Turkey and became news 
worldwide. International media depicted the protests as a clash between secularists and 
Islamists in a majority-Muslim country. Looking beyond a religious cleavage, the study aims 
(1) to delineate different groups of protest participants in terms of their opinion-based group 
identities and (2) to predict their democratic attitudes from the intersection of their religious 
identification with these group identities.  
Our study builds on social identity research about the emergence of opinion-based 
identities (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas & 
Bongiorno, 2009; Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009). This research shows that participants in 
action need not identify with pre-existing activist groups, yet opinion-based group 
memberships can emerge from a common stance on a specific issue (Bliuc et al., 2007; 
McGarty et al., 2009). Using this research as a heuristic framework, we propose that the Gezi 
park protest gave rise to plural opinion-based groups, who are aligned on selective issues or 
concerns, such as protecting the environment, women’s rights, or laicité, through participants’ 
engagement in specific actions. Our study derives different opinion-based groups bottom-up 
from participants’ common concerns (why do they engage in the protest?) and their online 
and offline actions during the protest (how do they engage?) via latent class analysis.  
Next we aim to explain participants’ support for democracy from the intersection of 
their religious identification as Muslims with their opinion-based group memberships. 
Whereas religious identification is generally associated with less support for democratic 
attitudes such as freedom of speech (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2008), 
we argue that the political implications of the same religious identity depend on its 
intersection with different group identities (for intersectionality of gender and ethnicity, 
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Deaux, 2001). Specifically, the association of Muslim identification with democratic attitudes 
should differ between distinct group identities. Democratic attitudes refer to support for 
democracy as a regime (Ariely & Davidov, 2011), freedom of speech (Verkuyten & Slooter, 
2008), non-authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003), and positive attitudes towards minority groups 
(Verkuyten, 2007). 
This study goes beyond previous research on collective action by studying the 
emergence and the multiplicity of opinion-based group identities inductively (beyond a single 
group identity or a dichotomy of supporters vs. non-supporters) and by covering both online 
and offline action forms (beyond a narrow focus on direct actions or intentions). Finally, this 
study de-constructs an essentialist representation of Muslim identity in Western media as a 
threat to democracy. Below we introduce the Gezi park protests and our theoretical 
framework.  
The Context of the Gezi Park Protests 
The Gezi park protests started on 26-May-2013 as a small peaceful protest in Istanbul 
against the destruction of Gezi Park. On 30 and 31 May several hundreds of protesters set up 
tents in the park (Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013). On May 30 at 5 am the police set fire to the tents. 
A few days later the protests escalated dramatically with 3.6 million people participating in 
98% of Turkish cities. They lasted for about a month (for a detailed account, Postmes, 
Bezouw, & Kutlaca, 2014). 
Two surveys at the beginning of the protests of over 3000 participants each document 
the backgrounds, preferences and demands of early activists (Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013; Farro 
& Demirhisar, 2014; KONDA, 2013). They were mostly educated young adults, as many 
women as men; 54% had not previously participated in any protest; and 70-80% did not lean 
towards any political party (Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013; KONDA, 2013). The Gezi protests 
emulate contemporary mass protests like the Occupy movement (Milkman, 2014) as bottom-
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up social movements attracting a wide range of participants, voicing concerns about lifestyles, 
liberties and values, and reaching out to traditionally ‘apolitical’ youth (Farro & Demirhisar, 
2014; Gümüş & Yılmaz, 2015). 
Opinion-Based Group Identities  
 Building on recent research about opinion-based group identities (Bliuc et al., 2007; 
McGarty et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2009), the first aim was to delineate subgroups of protest 
participants with similar concerns and action forms. Social identity research explains 
collective action from activist identification (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) or 
‘politicized collective identities’ (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). However, contemporary 
mass movements such as in Madrid, Cairo, New York or Istanbul attracted millions of people: 
a new generation of mostly urban and educated youth with no record of political activism or 
interest in conventional politics (Milkman, 2014). Rather than acting on prior politicized 
identities, participants in mass protests form opinion-based identities: “They simply share a 
common understanding and stance on a certain issue and hence come to share an opinion-
based group membership” (McGarty et al., 2009, p.849). To map opinion-based group 
memberships during large-scale Gezi park protests, our online survey includes peripheral 
participants as well as hardcore activists.     
We go beyond existing research on opinion-based groups in two ways. First, as 
contemporary mass protests connect various people, there should be plural opinion-based 
groups in a protest. Most research on opinion-based groups takes a binary approach: whether 
people support or oppose an opinion (government, Bliuc et al., 2007; a specific movement, 
Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012; a militant group leader, Thomas et al., 2015). Yet, mass 
protests mobilize distinct groups with different stances on several issues. For instance, the 
Occupy Movement spilled over into multiple groups from anti-capitalists over 
environmentalists to LGBTQ and undocumented migrants (Milkman, 2014).  
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Secondly, we examine configurations of different concerns with specific action forms 
to elucidate processes of selective alignment through joint participation in collective action. 
Research into opinion-based groups suggest that they form clear action norms, yet group 
identities are thought to precede the action (Thomas et al., 2009, 2012). Especially in mass 
protests, however, action may also create new group alignments (Drury & Reicher, 2000; 
Reicher, 1996; Reicher, 2001). Thus, in-depth retrospective interviews with activists about 
their experiences during the Gezi protests revealed emergent identities around new alignments 
across different concerns (Acar & Uluğ, 2016). As our study analyzes configurations of 
political concerns and actions during protests (no retrospective data), it does not imply a strict 
separation or directionality between concerns and actions.  
Political Concerns and Actions 
Political concerns—grievances (Klandermans, 1997) or perceived injustice (Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008)—are well-documented triggers of collective action (van Stekelenburg 
& Klandermans, 2013). Our study contextualizes concerns as perceived threats or violations 
of values such as life-style concerns motivating protest participation—in line with a ‘value 
path’ to political action (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 
2013). Such value-based concerns better predict current political protests than instrumental 
concerns such as economic motives (van Stekelenburg Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2009). In 
this study concerns cover general issues in collective action research such as democratic 
deficits, environmental problems, violations of women’s or minority rights, and context-
bound issues such as laicité vs. religious threat (rising Islamism) or national unity vs. ethnic 
threat (separatism) (Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013). Additionally, protest-based concerns—
‘incidental disadvantage’ (van Zomeren et al., 2008) or ‘suddenly imposed grievances’ 
(Walsh, 1981)—cover issues arising directly from the protest including police brutality and 
authoritarian government attitudes.  
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We conceive of specific actions people take to express their concerns as a key 
performative dimension of their group memberships (Klein, Russell, & Reicher, 2007; 
Reicher, 2001). “Collective action” is defined as action for a collective purpose on behalf of a 
group to improve its conditions (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). Most collective action 
research focuses narrowly on attitudinal support or ‘direct’ actions (or intentions) like 
demonstrating or striking (van Zomeren et al., 2008). We broaden the scope from direct or 
street-level action to indirect actions such as hanging flags from windows, honking cars, 
switching lights on and off, or banging pots and pans. Indirect actions deserve attention as 
they are less costly than direct action, lowering the threshold for non-activists to join protests. 
They are increasingly popular in contemporary protests, as in the 2011 democracy protests in 
China where participants were holding jasmine flowers (Clemm, 2011). 
We also asked about online activism. Social media are an effective action means to 
spread news (of meetings or emergencies) and to raise awareness about protests. While online 
protesting such as signing on-line petitions sometimes precludes offline protesting (Schuman 
& Klein, 2015), online interaction can also set the scene for offline action; and it is an action 
means in itself (McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith & Bliuc, 2014; Thomas et al., 2015). Due to 
the censored coverage of the Gezi park protests by traditional Turkish media, social media 
became all the more important. Most protesters (69%) learnt about the protests via social 
media (KONDA, 2013). Therefore, online activism was an integral part of the political action 
repertoire in the Gezi park protests.   
To conclude, rather than relying on pre-conceived identifications either with social 
categories (e.g., minority groups) or activist groups (e.g., feminist, trade unionist), we cover a 
broad range of political concerns and actions in the protests to inductively derive multiple 
opinion-based group memberships among protest participants.  
Intersectionality and democratic attitudes 
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The second aim was to predict participants’ democratic attitudes from the intersection 
of their religious identification with inductively-derived opinion-based identities (Deaux, 
2001). In this way, we empirically question the reification of Muslim religious identity as 
antithetical to democratic citizenship in international media and public discourse. Most 
research on intersectionality refers to intersections of race and gender, showing that the same 
gender identity has different implications for different racial or ethnic groups (Deaux, 2001). 
Similarly, the same Muslim identity may carry different political meanings across different 
groups in the Gezi park protest. As the contents of specific opinion-based groups are not 
predefined, we have no specific hypotheses as to the nature of their interaction with religious 
identification. 
Recent research in European migration contexts relating the religious identification of 
Muslim immigrant minorities to democratic political attitudes and engagement yields mixed 
findings (Fleischmann, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2013; Klandermans, Van der Toorn & Van 
Stekelenburg, 2008; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). As distinct from the Turkish context, the religious 
identity of Muslim citizens is a minority identity there, which sets them apart from the 
majority in their country of residence. To have a democratic political voice, this minority 
identity has to be seen as compatible with the national identity which includes the majority 
(Simon & Ruhs, 2008).  
Looking at the dynamic associations between religious identity and forms of 
democratic collective action or online activism, we underline the cultural constructions of 
these variables and their inter-relationships. Turkey is an interesting context because Muslim 
identity is a majority identity and internally diverse. Islam is more established and integrated 
into the political and societal culture. Consequently, people have different understandings of 
what being Muslim or Islam means (see Tessler, 2002 for the Arab world). This creates a 
strategic angle to de-amalgamate the Muslim identity of most participants in the Gezi park 
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protests and to challenge a common representation of Islam and Muslim identity as a threat to 
democracy in Western media.  
Method 
Participants 
During the first three weeks of the Gezi Park protests, 640 participants participated in 
an online survey (June 5-19, 2013). Mass protests began around May 31st—though gatherings 
in the park had begun a week earlier—and ended by June 2013. Our purposeful sample 
targeted anyone concerned about Gezi park protests including protesters and strong to weak 
supporters. Participants were reached through social media, e.g., via Facebook and Twitter 
(posting with trending hashtags). The effective sample consisted of highly-educated young 
adults (96% university student/graduate, 75% 17-30 years-old) from big cities (Istanbul 62%, 
Ankara 11%, İzmir 8%, other cities 6%, abroad 14%), and slightly more women (60%) than 
men. The sample covers a wide range of participants and supporters during Gezi park protests 
and its composition is similar to those reported in face-to-face surveys with larger samples 
(Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013; KONDA, 2013).  
Measures 
Political concerns. Concerns were mainly value-based (van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2013) or protest-based (Walsh, 1981) with additional instrumental concerns, 
covering and supplementing common grievances in collective action research (van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013) with relevant context-specific concerns such as laicite. 
The specific contents of concerns were derived from early surveys of the Gezi park protests 
(Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013; KONDA, 2013). Fourteen reasons for supporting (or opposing) 
Gezi park protests were listed and people indicated to what extent they felt concerned on a 
five-point scale (not at all-very much). Value-based concerns (n=9) referred to perceived 
threats or violations of values in various domains. Protest-based concerns (n=3) were over 
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authoritarianism, police brutality, and violent protesters.  Instrumental concerns (n=2) were 
over economy and foreign policy (for exact wordings of the concerns, Footnote 11). Higher 
scores indicated more grievances.  
Political action types. Attitudinal support was measured by two items with five-point 
scales: ‘To what extent do you support the protests?’ (not at all-totally supportive), and ‘To 
what extent do you oppose the protests?’ (totally opposed-not at all). Both items were 
averaged to indicate ‘support’, r(639) = .87, p < .001, M=4.57,  SD=0.93. 
Direct action (‘To what extent did you participate actively in the protests and 
demonstrations by being there?’) and indirect action (‘Did you participate in any other ways 
to support the protest such honking your cars, banging pots and pans, turning on and off 
lights, putting Turkish flags etc.?’) were measured separately with eight-point frequency 
scales (1=none, 2=a few hours, 3=half a day, 4=1-2 days, 5=3- 4 days, 6=5-6 days, 7=7-8 
days, 8=more). Direct action (M =3.86, SD =2.25) and indirect action (M =4.01, SD =2.59) 
were included as separate action forms, r(641)=.38, p < .001. 
Social media usage was assessed for Facebook and Twitter by two items each: 
‘Approximately how much time per day did you use Facebook/Twitter to follow news and 
updates’ or ‘to share/post news and updates about the protests in Turkey’, using seven-point 
frequency scales (1=Never, 2=0-1 hours, 3=1-3 hours, 4=3-5 hours, 5=5-7 hours, 6=7-10 
hours, 7=more than 10 hours). Following and sharing items were highly correlated for 
Facebook r(639)=.83, p < .001 and for Twitter r(621)=.84, p < .001, hence averaged to 
construct two variables: Facebook use (M=4.52, SD=1.83) and Twitter use (M=3.97, 
SD=2.22), r(630)=.38, p < .001. 
Religious identification as Muslim was measured with one item (Postmes, Haslam & 
Jans, 2013) on a seven-point scale (not at all-very strongly): ‘To what extent do you identify 
as Muslim?’.  
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Support for democracy was measured by four items (European Values Survey, 2008) 
with five-point scales (disagree-agree, α =. 73): ‘Although it has some problems, democracy 
is better than other regimes’, ‘economy doesn’t fare well in a democracy (R)’, ‘democracies 
are ridden with indecision, everybody has an opinion (R)’ and ‘democracies are not efficient 
in establishing public order (R)’. 
Support for freedom of speech was measured by four items with five-point scales 
(disagree-agree, α =.77): ‘In public, we must be able to say what we think, even if we run the 
risk of offending religious people’, ‘In public, we must be able to criticize politicians, 
including the Prime Minister’, ‘In public, we must be able to criticize leading historical 
figures, including Atatürk2’, ‘It should always be possible to show illustrations which make 
fun of whichever religion on television and in newspapers’. They were adapted from surveys 
among Muslim immigrants in Europe (The Integration of European Second Generation 
Belgium, 2008).  
Support for authoritarianism was measured by three items with five-point scales 
(disagree-agree, α=. 71) (Weber & Federico, 2007): e.g., ‘In the era we live in, it is necessary 
to lead the country with an iron fist’.  
Positive intergroup attitudes. The social distance question was used to measure 
positive attitudes towards minority groups (European Values Survey, 2008): ‘Whom you 
would not like to have as a neighbor?’. Answers were dummy-coded: 1 =wouldnot want, 0 
=doesnot matter. Religious minorities (Alevis, Christians, Jews, and Atheists), ethnic 
minorities (Kurds, Romans) and so-called marginalized minorities in the Turkish context 
(LGBTS, people who drink alcohol) were listed. These groups formed three factors, thus three 
distance scores from religious, ethnic and marginalized minorities were calculated (range 0-
1). A lower score indicated more positive attitudes.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations of the study variables. 
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Control variables. Age was used as a control variable for democratic attitudes 
(M=27.20, SD=7.04, range 17-64 years). Gender and city were dropped from the analysis 
since they had no significant effects. 
Results 
Data analysis involved two parts. First a latent class analysis (LCA) was conducted 
using Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). Similar to factor analysis assuming existence 
of latent dimensions, LCA assumes existence of latent groups of subjects and that respondents 
within the same group respond to items similarly (McCutcheon, 1987). Political concerns and 
action types were entered into the analysis to delineate different opinion-based group 
identities of the participants in the Gezi Park protests. Second, a series of regression analyses 
were conducted with these identities and Muslim identification and their statistical 
interactions as independent variables and democratic attitudes as dependent variables.  
Opinion-based group identities 
In deciding on the number of groups in LCA, we examined models with up-to-five latent 
classes, and selected a four-class model by comparing the interpretability and statistical 
soundness of different models (McCutcheon, 1987) (Table 2 for fit statistics). The four-class 
model compared to the three-class model gave better fit statistics (lower Bayesian Information 
Criterion [BIC] and Akaike Information Criterion [AIC] and higher entropy) and significantly 
improved the model fit over the three-class model using the bootstrap likelihood ratio test 
(BLRT) (Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007).  Comparing the four-class model to the 
five-class model, although the BLRT suggested significant improvement, other model fit 
indices showed little—if any—improvement in terms of log-likelihood, AIC or BIC values 
(Figures in the Supplementary Material); and the four-class model had higher entropy. We 
concluded that the four-class model was the best fit for our data.  
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The four different profiles of participants were labeled as ‘liberal’ (20%), ‘secularist’ 
(42.3%), ‘moderate’ (28.4%) and ‘conservative’ (9.3%) identities3. The choice of these labels 
was driven by the contents of distinctive concerns and actions of each group. These identities 
can be briefly defined as follows: “Liberals” are those who defend liberties for everyone, 
including the LGBT and ethnic minorities; ‘Secularists’ are those concerned with national 
unity and laicite, moderates were labeled as such because their concerns and actions showed 
selective overlap with liberals, secularists and conservatives; and conservatives were those 
pro-conservative government. Figure 1 displays the sum of probabilities of agreeing and 
strongly agreeing4 to various concerns by different groups. Figure 2 shows the mean 
frequencies of engagement in protests for each action type for different groups. We discuss 
below the concerns and action types that differentiate or overlap between different groups.  
Protest-based concerns (i.e., authoritarian attitudes of the government, police violence 
and provocateurs) were the only concerns shared by all participants. Participants differed 
meaningfully, however, in their value-based concerns and to some extent in their action forms 
during the protests. 
Both liberals and secularists shared similar value-based concerns about threats to the 
environment, democracy, and women’s rights (Figure 1). Liberals and secularists also 
differed: Distinctive concerns for liberals were about the protection of minority rights, those 
for secularists were about perceived ethnic (separatist) and religious (Islamist) threats to the 
nation state, valuing national unity and principled laicité. As for actions, both liberals and 
secularists supported the protests, participated actively and used social media, though 
secularists preferred the indirect action slightly more than liberals who preferred the direct 
action (Figure 2).  
Moderates showed some overlap with both liberals and secularists on value-based 
concerns such as threats to the environment, democracy and women’s rights. Conservatives 
BEYOND MUSLIM IDENTITY: GROUPS IN THE GEZI PROTEST  14 
 
showed little overlap with others on value-based concerns. Typical concerns for conservatives 
referred to police violence, violent protesters and, to some extent, the authoritarian 
government response. Conservatives were also least willing to support the protests—with 
moderates occupying a middle-ground between secularists vs. conservatives. As for actions, 
protest engagement was limited to social media use for conservatives, whereas moderates 
combined social media with indirect action.  
While this comparison across profiles is qualitative, as is generally the case for LCA, 
we can compare the four groups’ overall latent class means statistically. Mplus 7 provides the 
latent mean differences from the largest class as the reference category, i.e., the secularists. 
The mean difference from secularists was -1.515 for conservatives (p< .001), -0.401 for 
moderates (p = .046), and -0.755 for liberals (p < .001)5 
Looking at the importance of predictors (i.e., concerns and action) is also qualitative in 
LCA: those concerns and actions that differentiate across the latent classes are considered 
relatively better predictors. Endorsed by each group, protest-based concerns did not 
differentiate well across the four-latent classes. Instrumental concerns over economy and 
foreign policy did not differentiate well either, as they were not endorsed much by anyone. 
Actions, particularly social media, did not differentiate secularists, liberals and moderates. 
Results of an additional cluster analysis which provides quantitative information on the 
importance of the concerns and actions support our conclusions and shown in the 
Supplementary Material. 
Finally, since concerns and actions were analyzed together to delineate the group 
identities, the association between identities and actions cannot be tested statistically. We 
conducted additional LCA using only concerns to delineate the identities (with very similar 
compositions to LCA solution here) and additional regression analyses using those latent 
classes as predictors and action forms as the dependent variables. Results supported our 
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qualitative discussion of identities and action forms and are shown in the Supplementary 
Material.  
Associations of Muslim identification and opinion-based group identities with 
democratic attitudes  
Separate regression analyses were conducted with support for democracy, freedom of 
speech, authoritarianism and intergroup attitudes as dependent variables. For intergroup 
attitudes, the dependent variable was defined as a latent variable with distance towards 
religious, ethnic and marginalized minorities. As the predictor, the four groups were recoded 
as three contrasts using orthogonal contrast coding (Field, 2015): First contrast compared 
liberals and secularists to moderates and conservatives (coded as 2 2 -2 -2); second contrast 
compared liberals and secularists (coded as 1 vs. -1 with the remaining two coded as 0), and 
third contrast compared moderates and conservatives (coded as 1 vs. -1, with the remaining 
two coded as 0) (Table 1 for correlations). Orthogonal contrast coding was preferred because 
of the distinctions and similarities of concern and action profiles of liberals and secularists vs. 
moderates and conservatives and because of the absence of a single reference category as in 
the dummy-coding (Field, 2015). Additional analysis using linear trend coding of identities 
from liberal, secularist, moderates to conservatives shows very similar results to contrast-
coding and can be seen in the Supplementary Material. 
Three contrasts, Muslim identification (centered) and their statistical interactions were 
treated as independent variables and age as a control variable. The interactions and age were 
included in the analysis only when they were significant. Four self-identified Christians were 
excluded from the analysis. Results of the regression analyses were shown in Table 3. 
First, participants were asked whether democracy was a desirable regime. Contrast 1 
had a significant effect showing that liberals and secularists supported democracy more than 
moderates and conservatives. The intercept was above the midpoint of the scale, however, 
BEYOND MUSLIM IDENTITY: GROUPS IN THE GEZI PROTEST  16 
 
indicating that participants overall supported democracy as a regime. Neither Muslim 
identification nor the interaction had significant effects.  
              For endorsement of freedom of speech, all the contrasts had significant relationships 
showing that the difference between liberals and secularists (Contrast 2), that between 
moderates and conservatives (Contrast 3), and that between the first two and the last two 
(Contrast 1) were significant. Identification as Muslim was negatively related to freedom of 
speech. This relationship was qualified by a two-way interaction between contrast 1 and 
Muslim identification (p=.012) as shown in Figure 3. A simple slope analysis (Preacher, 
Curran, & Bauer, 2006) showed that the negative slope of Muslim identification was 
significant for both liberals and secularists (t=-3.611, p=0.001, d=.29) and for moderates and 
conservatives (t=-5.216, p < .001, d=.43), while the latter was stronger. 
 For authoritarianism, all the contrasts were significant showing that authoritarianism 
was endorsed by liberals less than secularists (Contrast 2), moderates less than conservatives 
(Contrast 3), and the first two less than the last two (Contrast 1). Muslim identification was 
positively related to authoritarianism. These effects were qualified by a two-way interaction 
between Contrast 1 and Muslim identification (p =.021) as seen in Figure 4. Simple slope 
analysis showed that the slope of Muslim identification was significant for moderates and 
conservatives (t=3.10, p=.002, d=.25), but not for liberals and secularists (p >.05).  
 For the social distance measure, Contrasts 1 and 2 were significant showing that 
liberals were less distant to minorities than the secularists (Contrast 2) and these two were less 
distant than moderates and conservatives (Contrast 1). Higher Muslim identification was 
related to higher distance. There were two significant two-way interactions of Contrasts 1 and 
3 with Muslim identification (respectively, p = .002, p = .008). For the Contrast 1 interaction, 
the slope of Muslim identification was significant for liberals and secularists (t=2.520, p = 
0.012, d=.21) and moderates and conservatives (t=5.309, p < .001, d=.44), while latter effect 
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was much stronger (Figure 5). For the contrast 3 interaction, the slope of Muslim 
identification was significant for conservatives (t=4.156, p < .001, d=.34) but not for 
moderates (p > .05).  
Discussion 
This research aimed (1) to delineate different groups of protest participants in terms of their 
opinion-based group identities and (2) to predict their democratic attitudes from the 
intersection of their religious identification with these group identities. The focus was on the 
2013 Gezi Park protests in Turkey, which was depicted as a divide between secularist and 
Islamists in a majority-Muslim country. Looking beyond this divide, our research challenges a 
homogenous representation of Muslim identity and its alleged association with undemocratic 
attitudes. First, participants’ political concerns and actions were clustered in four groups 
which we labeled ‘liberals’, ‘secularists’, ‘moderates’ and ‘conservatives’. Next these groups 
moderated the association of Muslim identification with democratic attitudes. Whereas 
conservatives and moderates endorsed democratic attitudes less with increasing religious 
identification, religious identification made little or no difference in liberals’ and secularists’ 
democratic attitudes.  
Let us discuss the four group identities. Extending a social identity approach of 
collective action, these group memberships were conceptualized as opinion-based group 
memberships around shared political concerns and actions. Research into opinion-based 
groups (including the normative alignment model and the encapsulated model of social 
identity in action) suggest that people who share common grievances may share an opinion-
based group membership with clear norms of action (Thomas et al., 2009, 2012). During mass 
protests, simultaneous processes of alignment and de-alignment of various concerns and 
actions among protest participants may give rise to different identities (Snow, Rochford, 
Worden & Benford, 1986). The notion of alignment around shared concerns receives also 
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indirect support from research on inductive social identity formation around shared goals or 
values through social interaction in small groups (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). In this 
study we researched the political concerns while the protest was happening, rendering the 
directionality test from concerns to actions (or vice versa) less relevant, and we aimed to 
derive constellations of political concerns and actions to show group alignments. This study 
contributes to this research line by highlighting multiplicity: Multiple concerns and action 
forms allow for the expression of multiple group memberships beyond the focus on a single 
group or a dichotomy of supporters vs. non-supporters.  
‘Liberals’ and ‘secularists’ shared concerns over environment, democracy and 
women’s rights but also differed in their concerns over minority rights vs. religious and ethnic 
threat. While liberals took to the streets, secularists preferred indirect action. Indirect action 
forms such as banging pots and pans are in the repertoire of secularist action means in Turkey 
to communicate concerns over laicite. This finding resonates with the normative alignment 
model’s argument that opinion-based groups have clear action norms (Thomas et al., 2009, 
2012) and with Reicher’s (2001) proposition that action types adopted by people document 
the performative nature of their group identities (Klein et al., 2007). The so-called 
‘moderates’ could be considered as conservative secularists because their concerns and 
actions showed selective overlap with secularists and conservatives. Finally, conservatives’ 
concerns were narrowly protest-based and their engagement was limited to online activism. A 
qualitative study of conservatives in the Gezi park protests supported our findings (Çelik, 
2015).  
Our findings go beyond the Gezi park protests and suggest new bottom-up methods to 
empirically investigate collective groups in contemporary mass protests across different 
cultural contexts. Latent class analysis allows for deriving multiple group memberships from 
the contents of shared political concerns and action forms. As a drawback of this approach, 
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however, we couldnot measure self-identifications with these groups which could exist with 
or without self-identifications. Another issue is the difficulty in naming the groups. In 
Turkish, we use ‘özgürlükçü’ (literally, person defending liberties) to refer to liberals while in 
English, the word ‘liberal’ may refer to those following liberal philosophy. Similarly, we do 
not claim that ‘moderates’ indicate a group identity by itself but it is an empirically and 
theoretically distinguishable group from conservatives and secularists.   
As for the main triggers of Gezi park protests, the value-based concerns such as threats 
to environment, democracy and women’s rights, the so-called life style concerns, played a big 
role, in line with studies underlining their importance over instrumental concerns for 
contemporary protests (Inglehart ve Catterberg, 2002; Milkman, 2014; van Stekelenburg et al. 
2009). Protest-based concerns (van Zomeren et al., 2009; Walsh, 1981)—highlighting the 
mutual interaction between (violent) protesters vs. the government and the police—also 
played a key role (Reicher, 1996). Qualitative studies of the Gezi park protests document the 
value- and protest-based grievances—ranging from democracy, minority rights to police 
brutality—as the main triggers of the protests (Acar & Uluğ, 2016; Çelik, 2015; Farro & 
Demirhisar, 2014; Gümüş & Yılmaz, 2015). 
Both online and offline activism were common grounds for action, though somewhat 
differently for different groups. Research does not specify when online activism hinders or 
facilitates offline activism. One may presume that where traditional media censorship is 
prevalent, online activism becomes an essential action means. McGarty and colleagues (2014) 
showed how important social media activism was in the Arab spring. A study on the use of 
Tweeter during Gezi park protests showed how online and offline protesting was intertwined 
by analyzing the time series of the tweets with the major on-the-ground events throughout a 
month (Varol, Ferrara, Ogan, Menczer & Flammini, 2014). Future research on both forms of 
action should consider the context of activism.  
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The second objective was to investigate how participants’ Muslim identification and 
their opinion-based group identities were associated with their endorsement of democratic 
attitudes. Based on the notion of intersectionality (Deaux, 2001), we expected that the 
association between Muslim identification and democratic attitudes would depend on these 
group memberships. While the Western interest in Muslims’ democratic attitudes is 
increasing, our study provides a strategic angle to this question as Muslim identity is a 
majority identity and more diverse in Turkey. Thus we raise the question how identities and 
their corresponding relations to democratic attitudes and forms of collective action are 
constructed in the culture they are embedded in.  
The fact that acceptance of democracy as a regime was consensual regardless of 
religious identification resonates with cross-national surveys which failed to find significant 
differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in their support for democracy (Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003). Research comparing Middle Eastern Muslim countries (Jamal & Tessler, 2008; 
Tessler, 2002) shows that Islamic attachments do not discourage support for democracy. 
However, comparing democratic attitudes such as freedom of speech and acceptance of 
minorities, Muslims were found to be less democratic than non-Muslims (Inglehart & Norris, 
2003; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2008).    
Going beyond this research, we showed that a common Muslim identity did not have 
the same political implications for democratic attitudes such as support for freedom of speech, 
anti-authoritarian attitudes and positive attitudes towards minorities, depending on the 
different political stances of protest participants. For liberals and secularists, it did not matter 
much whether they were strongly or weakly Muslim-identified, they endorsed the democratic 
attitudes nonetheless.  For conservatives and moderates, however, increasing religious 
identification meant being less supportive of democratic attitudes.  
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A following question is cross-cultural implications of these findings. Looking at 
Muslim immigrants in Europe, how would the dynamic relationship between their Muslim 
identity and democratic engagement unfold? Research across different European countries 
shows that the ways Muslim identities of immigrants are related to their civic identities and 
democratic engagement depend on the socio-political context (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2016; 
Fleischmann et al., 2013). This relationship may also vary according to Muslims’ own 
political stances on certain issues, or their opinion-based group identities. For instance, future 
research can investigate the ethnic vs. civic political concerns of Muslim immigrants (e.g., 
their positions over a homeland crisis vs. discrimination in the society they live) and how 
these would interact with their Muslim identification to predict when and how they would 
engage in collective action. 
Another question is whether we can talk about the intersectionality of Muslim identity 
in the so-called “democracy watch” protests in Turkey against the military coup attempt of 
2016 (Unver & Alassaad, 2016). Research by KONDA (2016) showed that most protesters 
were pro-conservative government; they identified their life styles as conservative (83%) vs. 
modern (17%); their Muslim identifications ranged from extreme (17%), moderate (67%) to 
weak (17%); and they were concerned over national unity, supporting democracy against the 
attempted coup and the president. Although the profile of these protesters and the content of 
their opinion-based identities could be different from those of the Gezi park protests, there are 
similarities. First, online activism was a part and promoter of protest participation like in the 
Gezi protests; yet this time coupled with mosque prayers calling people to streets like in the 
Arab spring (Unver & Alassaad, 2016). We can also speculate about the intersectionality: 
Muslim identification could have different implications for conservatively- and secularly-
(“modern”) identified participants’ democratic engagement and demands. However, we 
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should recognize different “democracy” conceptualizations, which could in itself entail a 
religious vs. secular divide. 
On a cautionary note, our correlational findings reveal that opinion-based group 
memberships and democratic attitudes are associated but the association may work both ways. 
Sharing a common stance on a certain issue may contribute to participants’ endorsement of 
democratic attitudes. Democratic attitudes can also be socialized in children and youngsters 
through family and school and inform participants’ concerns during the protests. There is 
some qualitative evidence to support the former: Intergroup contact among protest 
participants with diverse backgrounds changed their attitudes towards minority groups, such 
as the Kurdish minority, for the better (Acar & Uluğ, 2016). Finally, the possibility of reverse 
causality does not undermine our objective to demonstrate that the different group identities 
moderate the association of Muslim identification with democratic attitudes.  
Another limitation concerns the sampling strategy and the use of online survey. While 
self-selection of people in online surveys is an issue, this could be less problematic in this 
study as we aimed to reach (strong to weak) supporters of the protests. It was vital to include 
peripherals as well as activists in our analysis to show the broad range of people who were 
interested and concerned over Gezi park protests and to understand how the protests impact 
many more people than the hardcore activists. This is an added value over other qualitative 
studies on Gezi park protests which focused on the “activist” identity (Acar & Uluğ, 2016; 
Gümüş & Yılmaz, 2015). Moreover, participants’ demographic profiles and shared concerns 
described in this paper corresponds to those in other face-to-face surveys about the Gezi Park 
protests with much larger samples (Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013; KONDA, 2013). Consistency 
across several surveys lends support to the external validity of our findings. One final 
limitation is the use of single item for Muslim identification. It would be interesting to see 
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how other dimensions of identification including the performative side such as religious 
practice are related to democratic attitudes.  
Overall, this research adds to the collective action research in psychology by looking 
at plural opinion-based group identities in a contemporary mass protest, their intersection with 
Muslim identification and the role of these social identities in democratic politicization. It 
shows that opinion-based group identities of people in protests can be inferred from their 
shared concerns and action types empirically and that these plural identities intersect with 
religious identification as Muslim. It also highlights how the meaning of Muslim identity and 
its relationship to democratic engagement is culturally-embedded. Thus, Muslim identity is 
not a monolithic identity; it has different meanings and consequences for democratic attitudes. 
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Footnote 
  1 The exact wordings of the concerns were: ‘I was/am concerned/worried over’… 
‘gentrification and harmful environmental policies, including Gezi park, third bridge’, ‘tense 
international relations with neighbor countries (shortened as foreign policy)’, ‘deterioration of 
democracy’, ‘deterioration of principals and reforms of Atatürk’ (shortened as national unity), 
‘deterioration of laicite’, ‘deterioration of economy’, ‘deterioration and restriction of women’s 
rights’, ‘negative attitudes towards and the crackdown on LGBT people’,  ‘deterioration of the 
situation of minorities’, ‘the recent reconciliation policies leading to ethnic separatism’, 
‘deterioration of Islamic values’, ‘authoritarian attitudes of the government and the prime 
minister’, ‘brute force use by police during the protests’, ‘the provocateurs during the 
protests’. Italicized words are the labels shown in Figure 1.  
2Atatürk is one of the founding fathers of Turkish Republic and his principals and 
reforms go beyond national unity and include French-style laicite and patriotism among 
others. A detailed discussion of these reforms is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 3 The four-class model also provided a theoretically better fit for the data since the 
five-class model differentiated secularists further into two-classes, which was beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 4Mplus 7 calculates robust standard errors for MLR analysis separately for each 
probability—separate standard errors for the probability of agreeing and strongly agreeing. In 
the Figure, the higher standard errors (generally those of strongly agreeing) were shown.  
5 For the remaining comparisons, chi-square model difference test was used by setting 
equal the latent mean differences. Liberals were significantly different from moderates (χ²(1)= 
8.402, p < .01) and all were significantly different from conservatives (χ²(2) = 17.064, p < 
.001)  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Study Variables 
                
Intergroup Attitudes: 
Distance 
Variables of the 
Study 
% or 
Mean 
(SD) CNT2 CNT3 Muslim Democ. FreeSp. Author. 
Rel. 
Min. 
Ethn. 
min 
Marg. 
min 
CONTRAST1: 
Lib.-Sec. vs. 
Mod.-Cons. 
62.5 
vs. 
37.5% -.231** -.417** -.298** .120** .415** -.269** -.223** -.129** -.247** 
CONTRAST2: 
Lib. vs. Sec. 
20 vs. 
42.6%  .096* -.225** .002 .063 -.130** -.027 -.199** -.100* 
CONTRAST3: 
Mod. vs. Cons. 
28 vs. 
9.5%   -.086* -.011 .061 -.111** -.159** .056 -.176** 
Muslim 
 
3.87 
(2.31)    -.019 -.485** .310** .280** .277** .379** 
Democracy 
 
4.03 
(0.65)     .132** -.266** -.116** -.052 -.047 
Free Speech 
 
4.28 
(0.73)      -.387** -.263** -.248** -.388** 
Authoritarianism 
 
1.70 
(0.72)       .339** .292** .316** 
Distance  
Religious min 
 
0.06 
(0.19)        .489** .447** 
Ethnic min 
 
0.28 
(0.37)         .416** 
Marginal min 
 
0.22 
(.36)                   
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 2. LCAs with 2 to 5 Classes 
 
Model Fit Indices 2 class 3-class 4-class 5-class 
Log Likelihood -16464.998 -15798.918 -15423.359 -15423.4 
AIC 33185.997 31977.836 31350.719 31067.35 
BIC 33758.061 32826.994 32476.97 32470.7 
Entropy 0.993 0.926 0.932 0.922 
Bootstrap Likelihood ratio test 
(BLRT) 
1 vs. 2 2 vs. 3 3 vs.4 4 vs. 5 
2881.164 1332.161 751.118 407.366 
p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 
n for each class C1 = 570 C1 = 66 C1 = 60 C1=130 
 C2 = 75 C2 = 210 C2 = 183 C2=59 
  C3= 369 C3 = 129 C3=169 
   C4=273 C4=150 
        C5=137 
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Table 3. Separate Regression Analyses showing the Relationship of Opinion-based Group 
Identities and Muslim Identification with Democratic Attitudes  
 
Predictors Democracy Free Speech Authoritarianism Intergroup Attitudes 
Contrast1: Liberals-
Secularists vs. 
Moderates-
Conservatives 
.058 (.017)** 
 
.142(.024)*** 
 
-.111(.026)*** 
 
-.013(.005)* 
 
Contrast2:  Liberals 
vs. secularists .026(.038) .102(.045)* -.180(.049)*** -.029(.010)** 
Contrast3: 
Moderates-
conservatives 
.074 (.052) 
 
.176(.085)* 
 
-.194(.093)* 
 
-.018(.019) 
 
Muslim .022(.013) -.115(.018)*** .059(.020)** .025(.004)*** 
Contrast1*Muslim ns .023(.009)* -.023(.010)* -.007(.002)** 
Contrast2*Muslim ns .003(.019) -.004 (.021) -.003(.004) 
Contrast3*Muslim ns .010(.031) -.035 (.034) -.019(.007)** 
Age .012 (.004)** Ns ns ns 
Intercept 3.664 4.227 1.714 0.050(Rel. min) 
    0.214 (Ethnic min) 
    0.250(Marg. min) 
R2 0.037* .357*** .197*** .348* 
Note. Non-significant variables were dropped from the analyses, denoted as ns. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 1. Summed probability of agreeing and totally agreeing to the concerns by different 
identities (with standard error bars) 
 
Figure 2. Levels and types of action in the protests by different identities (with standard error 
bars) 
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Figure 3. Interaction between Muslim Identification and Contrast 1 (Liberals & Secularists 
vs. Moderates & Conservatives) on Freedom of Speech 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between Muslim Identification and Contrast 1 (Liberals & Secularists 
vs. Moderates & Conservatives) on Authoritarianism 
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Figure 5. Interaction between Muslim Identification and Contrast 1 (Liberals & Secularists 
vs. Moderates & Conservatives) on Distance towards Minorities 
Note. The intercept of the distance towards ethnic minorities was used, as the latent intercept 
was not calculated 
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Supplemental Online Material 
Figures showing Fit Statistics for 2 to 5 Latent Class Solutions 
 
Figure 1. Supplementary Material. Log Likelihood Results for 2 to 5 Latent Class Solutions  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Supplementary Material. Fit Statistics for 2 to 5 Latent Class Solutions  
 
 
 
-16600
-16400
-16200
-16000
-15800
-15600
-15400
-15200
-15000
-14800
2 class 3-class 4-class 5-class
Log Likelihood
29500
30000
30500
31000
31500
32000
32500
33000
33500
34000
2 class 3-class 4-class 5-class
FIT STATISTICS
AIC
BIC
BEYOND MUSLIM IDENTITY: GROUPS IN THE GEZI PROTEST  38 
 
Importance of Concerns and Actions  
in Predicting Opinion-based Group Identities 
In terms of the importance of predictors (i.e., concerns and action) in LCA, those 
concerns and actions that differentiate well across the four latent classes can be considered 
better predictors; but LCA does not provide any quantitative distinctions. We also conducted 
a 2-step cluster analysis to provide information about predictor importance. The two 
groupings by LCA and 2-step cluster analysis substantially overlap (r = .87, p < .001). Cluster 
compositions were: Liberals (22%) secularists (35%), moderates (32%) and conservatives 
(12%). We thus believe that results of 2-step cluster analysis can provide useful information 
regarding the importance of the predictors that we can only qualitatively infer in LCA. 
Protest-based concerns did not differentiate well between the clusters as well as those 
concerns about foreign policy, Islam and economy. Action forms did not differentiate well 
either particularly social media activism.  
Table 1. Supplementary Material. 
Predictor Importance  
Religious threat (Laicite) 1.00 
National unity 0.94 
Women 0.88 
LGBT 0.80 
Minorities 0.75 
Democracy 0.71 
Environment 0.70 
Support 0.69 
Ethnic threat (Separatism) 0.57 
Authoritarian 0.49 
Economy 0.48 
Foreign Policy 0.43 
Police violence 0.40 
Islam 0.29 
Indirect action 0.16 
Direct Action 1.50 
Provocateurs 0.15 
Social Media-Facebook 0.07 
Social Media-Twitter 0.03 
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Opinion-based Group Identities (based on Concerns) Predicting Action Forms 
Theoretically, the aim of the paper was to present typologies/configurations of action 
motives/concerns and forms to elucidate processes of selective alignment through joint 
participation in the action, rather than predicting behavior from these concerns/motives. This, 
however, provides only a qualitative discussion of how motives are communicated through 
particular actions so they are entwined in the formation of opinion-based group identities. It is 
also possible to delineate these identities using only concerns in LCA to test the association 
between the group identities and action forms statistically. First, LCA solution with four 
classes using only concerns gave a very similar composition of these identities (see Table 2 
below for cross-tab). Second, results of the regression analyses supported the discussion in the 
paper (see Table 3 below): Liberals and secularists were more active in all the types of action 
forms compared to moderates and conservatives; the difference between secularists and 
liberals lied in the type of participation so that the former preferred indirect participation 
while the latter preferred direct participation more; and moderates were also more active than 
conservatives but the difference was smaller with regards to social media activism.    
 
Table 2. Supplementary Material. Cross-Tab of LCA solutions using only Concerns vs. 
Concerns and actions 
  Opinion-based Group Identities: ONLY Concerns 
Opinion-based 
Group Identities: 
Concerns and 
Actions Secularists Moderates Conservatives Liberals Total 
Secularists 253 14 0 5 272 
Moderates 3 165 13 1 182 
Conservatives 0 7 50 0 57 
Liberals 1 3 0 125 129 
Total 257 189 63 131 640 
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Table 3. Supplementary Material. Multivariate Regression Analysis with Opinion-based Group 
Identities as Predictors (based on concerns) and Action Forms as Dependent Variables 
Predictors Support 
Direct 
Participation 
Indirect 
Participation FB Twitter 
Contrast1: Liberals-
Secularists vs. 
Moderates-
Conservatives .325(.014)*** .492 (.047)*** .449 (.054)*** .281(.040)*** .215(.049)*** 
Contrast2:  Liberals vs. 
secularists .023 (.497) .299 (.111)** -.539 (.127)*** -.086 (.095) -.167 (.118) 
Contrast3: Moderates 
vs. conservatives .953(.046)*** .962 (.150)*** 1.249 (.173)*** .340 (.128)** .364 (.159)* 
Intercept 4.254 3.534 3.480 4.314 3.770 
R2 .516*** .155*** .157*** .080*** .037* 
 
 
Linear Trend Analyses for Opinion-based Group Identities, and its Interaction with 
Muslim Identification on Democratic Attitudes 
In the paper we used orthogonal contrast coding for recoding the group identities for 
regression analysis. One can also recode the identities with a linear trend coding: Liberals (2), 
secularists (1), moderates (-1), and conservatives (-2). Table 2 shows the results of separate 
regression analyses on democratic attitudes with the linear trend coding of these identities, 
Muslim identification and their interactions as predictors.  The main effects of the linear trend 
on democratic attitudes were significant showing that there was an increasing endorsement of 
democracy and freedom of speech and decreasing endorsement of authoritarianism and 
distance to minorities from liberals, secularists, moderates to conservatives. Similar to the 
results in the paper, the interactions between the identities coded as linear trend and Muslim 
identification were significant for freedom of speech, authoritarianism and intergroup 
attitudes. In order to graph the interactions, the means were calculated for +1SD and -1SD for 
Muslim identification. As seen in the Figures 1-3, the relationship of Muslim identification 
with democratic attitudes gets stronger from liberals to secularists to moderates to 
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conservatives. We can also see that secularists and liberals on the one hand, and moderates 
and conservatives on the other show similar patterns to each other 
 
Table 4. Supplementary Material. Separate Regression Analyses showing the Relationship of 
Opinion-based Group Identities (Linear Trend), and Muslim Identification with Democratic 
Attitudes 
Predictors Democracy Free Speech Authoritarianism Intergroup Attitudes 
Linear Trend  .072 (.022)** .181(.020)*** -.143(.022)*** -.023(.005)*** 
Muslim .022(.013) -.119(.012)*** .065(.013)*** .023(.003)*** 
LinearTrend*Muslim ns .036 (.008)*** -.028(.009)** -.007(.002)** 
Age .012 (.004)** ns ns ns 
Intercept 3.679 4.256 1.712 0.058(Religious min) 
    0.227 (Ethnic min) 
    0.266(Marginal min) 
R2 0.034* .352*** .166*** .348* 
 Note. Linear trend coding: Liberals (2), Secularists (1), Moderates (-1), Conservatives (-2)  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Supplementary Material. The interaction between Muslim identification and linear 
trend on Freedom of Speech 
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Figure 4. Supplementary Material. The interaction between Muslim identification and linear 
trend on Authoritarianism 
 
 
Figure 5. Supplementary Material. The interaction between Muslim identification and linear 
trend on Distance 
Note. The intercept based on the distance towards ethnic minorities was used, as the latent 
intercept was not calculated 
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